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Casenote
Torres v. Xomox: Allocating Worker's Compensation Benefits
and Post Verdict Settlement Proceeds Under Proposition 51
Mike Weed
INTRODUCTION
If you asked Americans on the street, most would probably agree that we have
developed into a society bent on litigation. Faster than ever, people today are turning
to the courts to settle disputes that seemingly, just a few years' ago, would have been
quickly and rationally resolved among themselves.! In particular, tort litigation, or
what the layman would understand as the law of personal injury, leads the lawsuit
frenzy in proliferation of suits and controversy generated.2 Whether it is a suit over
the temperature of coffee spilled on oneself,3 or a suit against a city for a turned ankle
on a public tennis court, 4 the perception created by today's commonplace tort actions
is that the legal system is out of control and headed for a breakdown.5
Tort litigation has come a long way in its storied history. Driven by the balancing
of competing public policies, it became clear that injuries to persons and property
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred 1998; B.A., University of
Redlands, Philosophy/History double major 1986.
1. See Jennifer Nicholson, Consumers Pay Pricefor Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1986, at 18 (describing
the flight to the courts to resolve seemingly minor disputes, and noting that this phenomena has given Orange
County the distinction of leading the State of California in the filing of automobile accident lawsuits); Jeff D.
Opdyke, Frivolous Lawsuits Prove Costly, ORANGE CTY. REG., May 19, 1991, at BI (explaining that lawsuits of
questionable merit are commonplace in today's society).
2. See Nicholson, supra note 1, at 18 (stating that a permissive attitude regarding filing lawsuits has
evolved in American society, particularly suits involving injuries to person and property); Opdyke, supra note 1,
at BI (detailing specific "nuisance lawsuits" as examples of the controversial suits being initiated, such as a surfer
suing a city for injury to his lip, a drunk driver suing paramedics and police for battery and false imprisonment
during their efforts to provide aid, and a driver who rear-ended a truck suing a city claiming the caulking compound
used to repair the street caused her inability to stop).
3. See A Second Lawsuit is Filed Over Spillage of Hot Coffee, Hous. CHRON., May 26, 1995, at 34
(explaining that the attorney who won a 2.8 million dollar verdict against McDonald's for burns sustained when
a woman spilled hot coffee on herself had initiated a second, similar suit against Burger King on behalf of a man
who claimed he was burned by hot coffee in that establishment).
4. See Opdyke, supra note 1, at BI (noting the questionable basis of suits seeking damages for turned
ankles or stumbles during recreational activities, pointing out that those types of injuries are the risks of the game).
5. See Mark C. Barabak, Peninsula Group Pushes Initiative on Lawsuits, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 4, 1986, at
14 (detailing the effort planned by a group of businessmen to alter the existing tort system with a "loser pays"
requirement); Robert B. Gunnison, State Lawmakers to Tackle Tort Reform, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 15, 1986, at 8
(anticipating a "flock" of bills to be introduced to the state legislature in an attempt to reform the tort system);
Nicholson, supra note 1, at 18 (calling for further changes in the tort system, beyond those enacted by Proposition
51, to help destroy the "psychology of entitlement" that has added to the rush to the courthouse).
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often deserved to be, in fact needed to be, compensated. 6 This evolution is on-going,
but some claim that it has gone too far; that today, tort law recognizes and com-
pensates people with injuries beyond those that are deserving.7 Moreover, it is argued
that what began as a doctrine dedicated to establishing fair standards of account-
ability between victim and tortfeasor, has been distorted over time into a legal
mechanism that often indiscriminately thrusts financial responsibility on tortfeasors
who are the least culpable among several.9
As with any evolutionary pattern, characteristics develop and change. The
process of natural selection retains those characteristics that are beneficial to the
evolving entity and discards those that are harmful or obsolete. So it is with the law
of torts.
As the intricacies of tort law evolved, the doctrine of joint and several liability
developed.'0 Over time, this doctrine too has undergone change, and the changes
continue to this day." Those aspects that are beneficial are retained, and those that
are deemed harmful or obsolete are discarded. The difficulty, however, is that the
evolution of tort law, and joint and several liability in particular, is driven by the
subjective minds of human beings, not the objective processes of nature. Thus, while
the changes are being undertaken, it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate
ourselves from the process and find an objective vantage point. Moreover, the
process of evolution in tort requires a balancing of competing social interests, which
must be continually adjusted as social values shift and change. What characteristics
are beneficial, and what should be discarded, must be decided subjectively, and the
passage of time is the only available guidepost from which we can form an
evaluation of those decisions.
This Casenote examines one narrow vein in the evolution of California tort law.
The doctrine of joint and several liability has been and continues to be a hallmark of
tort law.'2 However, caught in the pressures of evolution, joint and several liability
has also been altered.' 3 Proposition 51, 14 approved by the voters of California in
6. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 111-12, 443 P.2d 561, 563-64, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97. 99-100
(1968) (reciting the fundamental notion of social responsibility in California as embodied by California Civil Code
§ 1714).
7. See supra notes 1 and 3 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-67, 150 P.2d 436, 440-43 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring) (espousing what would become a seminal opinion regarding the relationship between the
interests of victims and tortfeasors, and how the proper balance should be struck).
9. See Deep Pockets, S.F. CHRON., June 2, 1986, at 52 (arguing that joint and several liability results in
local governments being held liable for huge damage awards even though they are minimally at fault); Cherry Gee,
The Statewide Propositions on the June 3 Ballot, L.A. TIMES, June 1. 1986, at 3 (claiming that passage of
Proposition 51 would result in fewer frivolous suits and end the unfairness produced by existing law).
10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra Part L
12. See infra Part I.
13. See infra Part I.
14. Codified as CAL. Civ. CODE § 1432 (West 1987).
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1986, changed joint and several liability, causing continuing questions of inter-
pretation." This Casenote examines the case of Torres v. Xomox Corp.,16 which is
the first appellate court decision interpreting the proper method of allocating, or
crediting, worker's compensation benefits and post-verdict settlements between
multiple tortfeasors in light of Proposition 51.17
Part One of this Casenote overviews the development of joint and several
liability in California, from its beginning to the enactment of Proposition 51. Speci-
fically, Part One addresses the particular changes created and the various policies
asserted in favor of and against the initiative. Part Two describes the facts and
holding of Xomox. Part Three discusses the alternative methods of allocation con-
sidered by the court, emphasizing the method selected. Finally, Part Four offers an
alternative method of damage allocation, focussing on achieving the best possible
balance between the competing interests of plaintiffs, defendants and the public in
general, in light of the policy goals of both Proposition 51 and the law of tort itself.
I. THE EVOLUTION
A. A Historical Overview of Joint and Several Liability in California
For more than a century, California has followed the concept of joint and several
liability, in which any one of multiple tortfeasors can be held liable for the entire
amount of damages sustained by an injured plaintiff. 8 Codified as California Civil
Code § 1431, the concept dates back to California's adoption of the Field Code in
187229 Underlying joint and several liability was the rationale that a plaintiffs
damages could not be mechanically distributed among several tortfeasors if each had
played a causal role in the harm.' Liability for any particular defendant depended on
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. 49 Cal. App. 4th 1, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 455 (1996).
17. Id. at 7, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459.
18. Robert N. Pafundi, Proposition 51 Takes Hold, CAL. LAW. J., July, 1990, at 48.
19. Ellyn Moscowitz, The Fair Responsibility Act of 1986: How Fair Is t?, 13 WHrrnER L. REv. 909, 911
(1992).
20. See, e.g., McCool v. Mahoney, 54 Cal. 491,491 (1880) (stating that, in an action for joint trespass, the
damages could not be divided among several defendants). This notion may focus upon the indivisibility of the harm,
rather than the indivisibility of fault on the part of the defendants. Until 1976, California refused to allocate fault
among multiple defendants, thus justifying joint and several liability against any one tortfeasor if culpable in any
degree. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P. 2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (adopting the
comparative fault system in California). Indivisibility of harm functions as its own rationale for joint and several
liability, justifying the imposition of liability on any one defendant if no single cause among many can be directly
attributed to a particular portion of the harm. Because each tortfeasor's conduct could have caused the entire harm,
each must be potentially liable for the whole of the damages, absent individual exculpation. See, e.g., Kingston v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 211 N.W. 913,915 (Wis. 1927). However, at least one court has been willing to venture into
the apportionment of harm between multiple defendants where a reasonable basis for the division can be identified.
See, e.g., In re Bell Petroleum Svcs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 903-04 (5th Cir. 1993); see also RESTATEMENT (SECoND)
OFTORTS. § 433A.
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the establishment of a causal connection between that defendant and the plaintiff's
harm, but once established, that defendant could be forced to bear the entire burden
of the judgment regardless of the relative degree of culpability of that defendant?'
In 1948, the California Supreme Court expanded the reach of joint and several
liability in Summers v. Tice.'m Prior to Summers, imposition of joint and several
liability was founded on the concurrence of harmful conduct by multiple actors, with
liability attaching only to those actors playing a causal role in the injuryr In
Summers, however, the court imposed joint and several liability on two defendants,
only one of whom could possibly have caused the plaintiff's injury.24 Unfortunately,
it was not physically possible to determine which defendant actually caused the
injury.2 Basing its decision on public policy, the Court held that the plaintiff should
not bear the burden of proving which defendant caused the harm, but rather, the
defendants should be forced to absolve themselves individually to escape liability.
26
The alternative, which would leave the plaintiff without redress because of the
physical impossibility of proving individual causation, was not acceptable as a policy
matter.2 Based on the parties' relative positions, it was preferable to hold each
potential tortfeasor jointly and severally liable, rather than entirely denying the
plaintiff's opportunity to recover.28 Thus, after Summers, joint and several liability
was expanded to reach not only those defendants found to be causally connected to
the harm, but also those wrongdoers who could not absolve themselves of a possible
causal connection.29
21. See Moscowitz, supra note 19, at 911-12.
22. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d I(1948).
23. See Moscowitz, supra note 19, at 911.
24. Summers, 33 Cal. 2d at 85-86, 199 P.2d at 3-4. The facts of the case were as follows: The plaintiff and
the two defendants were together on a hunting trip, when both defendants fired their shotguns simultaneously. The
plaintiff was struck in the eye by a pellet fired by one of the defendants. Medical and forensic technology at the time
did not provide any means to identify from which gun the pellet had been fired. Thus, at trial, the plaintiff had no
physical method to prove which of the defendants had actually caused his injury, though it was clear that one of
the two was responsible. Id. at 80-81, 199 P.2d at 1-2.
25. See id. at 80-81, 199 P.2d at 1-2.
26. Summers, 33 Cal. 2d at 86-88, 199 P.2d at4-5.
27. Id.
28. Id.; see also RESTATEiENT (SECOND) OFTORTS, § 433B(3) & cmt. f (1996) (adopting the holding of
Summers and offering the justification that the plaintiff should not be forced to forego recovery merely because the
circumstances are such that he cannot identify which wrongdoer actually caused his injury).
29. For an expansive application of the Summers doctrine, see Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607
P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), where the California Supreme Court allowed a plaintiff to proceed against a
group of drug manufacturers, even though it was not certain that the particular harm-causing manufacturer was in
the courtroom. Id. at 610-12, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45. The Court held that the defendant
manufacturers could be held jointly and severally liable if the plaintiff demonstrated that the named defendants
represented a "substantial share" of the market-manufacturers of the particular drug. Id. In practical effect, the Court
expanded the Summers doctrine to require each defendant, in order to escape joint and several liability, to prove
that it had not caused the plaintiff s harm, even if the plaintiff could not establish that one of the named defendants
actually caused the harm.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 29
With California's adoption of comparative fault principles in Li v. Yellow Cab,30
the resilience of joint and several liability was challenged. One possible view was
that the comparative fault system, founded on the principle of liability in proportion
to fault,3 was inherently contrary to the concept of joint and several liability, where
a minimally culpable tortfeasor could bear the full financial responsibility for an
injury.32 However, the California Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion in
American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court.33 Confronted with the argument
that the comparative fault principles adopted in Li v. Yellow Cab undermined the
doctrine ofjoint and several liability, the Court concluded that their acknowledgment
of the law's ability to apportion fault did not translate into an acknowledgment that
injuries were necessarily divisible in correlation to those proportions of faultM The
Court reasoned that causation was distinct from culpability; a minimal degree of fault
did not necessarily demonstrate that a defendant's conduct only caused a corres-
ponding degree of harm.35 Thus, joint and several liability remained viable in
California after the adoption of comparative fault principles, protecting plaintiffs'
ability to recover the entire judgment from any one defendant? 6
At the same time, however, the Court also created the doctrine of equitable
indemnity, providing a mechanism for defendants who pay more than their pro-
portional share of the plaintiff's recovery to seek contribution from the other defen-
30. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (adopting a
comparative fault system for negligence actions in California); see also Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart. 21 Cal.
3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 144 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978) (extending comparative fault principles to strict liability actions);
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978) (extending comparative
fault principles to products liability actions).
31. See Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 812-13, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864 (discussing the fairness inherent
in proportional fault).
32. See, e.g., Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867,873-74 (Kan. 1978) (interpreting the Kansas comparative fault
statute as necessarily abrogating the doctrine of joint and several liability). The Kansas Supreme Court held that
the mandate of a comparative fault system is to ensure that the extent of liability equates to a defendant's degree
of fault. Id. In the Court's view, fairness can only be achieved by maintaining this correlation. Id. The Court found
no social policy compelling a defendant to pay more than its proportional share of damages as determined by fault,
stating that, even when defendant insolvency is a variable, after the enactment of comparative fault, "[the plaintiffs
now take the parties as they find them." Id.; see also, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.5 (West 1987)
(abolishing joint and several liability as contrary to comparative fault principles); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38
(1996) (same); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (Michie 1997) (same).
33. 20 Cal. 3d 578,578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
34. Id. at 588-89, 578 P.2d at 905, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
35. Id. (explaining that it will remain commonplace, even after comparative fault, for the actions of each
tortfeasor to be potentially responsible for an entire injury).
36. Id. at 588-90, 578 P.2d at 905-907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188-90. As was the Kansas Supreme Court's
decision in Brown, the California court's conclusion was founded on concepts of fairness. Id. However, the
California court focused upon the notion that it is patently unfair to place the risk of defendant insolvency on the
victim of negligent conduct. Id. The Court found that, given a choice between the parties, the wrongdoers should
bear the risk of the insolvency rather than the plaintiff. Id. Therefore, the retention of joint and several liability,
rather than its abolition, preserves the principles of fairness on which comparative fault is based. To paraphrase the
Kansas Supreme Court, in California terms, the defendant takes the parties as they find them. See supra note 32.
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dants.37 By creating this common law doctrine of contribution, the Court was
satisfied that it had achieved the proper balance between the plaintiff's interest in
obtaining full recovery and the need for equitable limits on a defendant's exposure
to disproportionate liability.38
B. Proposition 51 Emerges
Although the decision in American Motorcycle was intended to strike an
equitable and maintainable balance between the competing interests of injured plain-
tiffs and defendants, it was not long until the push for further tort reform resurfaced.
Throughout the 1980's, the push for tort reform was a constant theme among
legislators, lobbyists, and the insurance industry.3 9 These efforts were resisted on
several fronts by the proponents of the victim's, consumer's or plaintiff's interests. 40
The election of June 3, 1986, turned out to be the battleground where the competing
interests would engage, battling over what was termed the "Fair Responsibility Act
of 1986.'
Proposition 51, placed on the June 1986 ballot as a voter initiative, was a direct
attack on the status quo of joint and several liability in California.4" Focusing on the
line between economic43 and non-economic" damages in a plaintiffs award, the
37. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 590-98, 578 P.2d at 907-12, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190-95.
38. Id. The practical usefulness of the equitable indemnity doctrine seems limited in many situations. Where
defendant insolvency is not an issue, the plaintiffcollects from one defendant, and that defendant merely bears the
inconvenience of collecting the proportional shares from the other defendants. This, of course, forces a separate
proceeding upon already overburdened courts. However, if defendant insolvency is an issue, the plaintiff collects
from the solvent defendant, who is then essentially left without a remedy. Clearly, that defendant has the right to
an equitable indemnity action against the non-paying defendants, but if they are insolvent, the right has little value.
Thus, in reality, the defendant has no recourse even after equitable indemnity. Moreover, in the event of a good-
faith settlement by a defendant, the non-settling defendant cannot pursue the settling defendant at all. See id. at 604,
578 P.2d at 915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198-99. Because the liability of the non-settling defendant is reduced by the
dollar amount of the settlement, rather than the percentage of fault apportioned to the settling defendant, unless the
amount of the settlement is equal to or more than the settling defendant's share of the damages, the non-settling
defendant will pay more than its proportional share of damages, and again, be left without recourse for collection.
However, the Court certainly was aware of these possibilities in deciding American Motorcycle Corp., apparently
concluding, however, that the better social policy was to ensure that the plaintiff did not suffer the shortfall when
insolvency or settlement made inequity in some form an unavoidable reality.
39. See Jack Germond & Jules Witcover, Will Prop. 51 Light A Fire?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 31,
1986, at B1O (discussing the push for tort reform); Gunnison, supra note 5 (noting that numerous bills aimed at tort
reform were introduced in the California Legislature); Nicholson, supra note 1 (detailing frivolous suits and the
reaction against them); Opdyke, supra note I (discussing municipal liability and the push for reform).
40. See, e.g., Michael Abrams, Brown Tells of Prop. 51 Limits, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., May 31, 1986, at
A22; Gee, supra note 9, at 3; Ralph Nader's Opposition to Prop. 51, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 1986, at 2 [hereinafter
Nader] .
41. CALtFORNu BALLOTPAMPHLET, Primary Election, June 3,1986, at 33 (hereinafter BALLOTPAMPHLmT).
42. See id. at 32 (summarizing the initiative).
43. Id. at 33 (codified as CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997)) (defining "economic damages"
as "objectively verifiable monetary losses including medical expenses, loss of earnings, burial costs, loss of use of
property, costs of repair or replacement, costs of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment and
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initiative barred the application of joint and several liability to the non-economic
portion of the damages.4 5 Joint and several liability would continue to apply for all
economic damages, enabling the plaintiff to continue to collect the whole of that
portion of its damages from any one of multiple defendants.4! However, a defen-
dant's liability for non-economic damages, under the proposal, would be several
only.47 Thus, any one defendant could be liable for non-economic damages only in
proportion to its allocated degree of fault, as determined under comparative fault
principles.4
Proposition 51 was one of the most hotly contested voter initiatives in California
history.49 Each side spent freely in the campaign, with the total amount dedicated to
swaying the voters reaching record levels.50 The battle focused squarely on the issue
of fairness and which system of law could best achieve it.5' However, the competing
views of fairness could not have been further polarized.
The proponents52 of Proposition 51 rallied around a concept of fairness that
focused on equitable allocation of damages.53 Labeling joint and several liability as
loss of business or employment opportunities").
44. Id. (codified as CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997)) (defining "non-economic damages"
as "subjective, non-monetary losses including, but not limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering,
emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation").
45. Id. at 32 (analyzing the initiative).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 33 (codified as CAL. Crv. CODE 1431.2(a) (West Supp. 1997)).
48. Id. at 32 (explaining the impact of the initiative).
49. See Prop. 51 Insurance Changes Slow in Coming, SAN DiEGo UNIoN-TRIB., Nov. 27, 1986, at A50
[hereinafter Insurance Changes] (discussing the heated conflict over the initiative).
50. See id. at A50 (noting that over 11 million dollars were spent in the campaign for and against the
initiative).
51. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 41, at 34-35 (contrasting the arguments for and against the
initiative).
52. Proponents of Proposition 51 included the California Taxpayer's Association, the California State
Parent-Teacher Association, League of California Cities, Consumer Alert, California Manufacturers Association,
Association for California Tort Reform and the California Police Chiefs Association, among many others. BALLOT
PAMPHLET, supra note 41, at 35.
53. See BALL T PAMPHLEr, supra note 41, at 34. The notion that it was unfair to force one defendant to pay
for harm that was another defendant's fault is based on two component concepts. First, it is founded on the
comparative fault principles established by Li, where the California Supreme Court accepted the idea that the
conduct of several actors in causing a harm can be separated into proportional degrees of fault. More importantly,
the proponents of Proposition 51 expanded the relation between proportionality of fault and a plaintiff's harm to
make the theoretical assumption that a defendant's proportion of fault correlates to the amount of actual harm
caused by that defendant. Proposition 51 rests on the argument that it is inherently fair that a defendant only pay
damages proportional to its degree of fault. (Although Proposition 51 sought only to limit joint and several liability
to "non-economic" damages, the fairness basis of their argument, taken to its logical conclusion, is that true fairness
would mean that defendants pay proportionally to fault across the beard. However, political realities and recognition
of the need to protect a plaintiff's valid interest in compensation likely led to the compromise position of the
initiative.) This argument necessarily rests on the assumption that the defendant, in doing so, is completely
compensating the plaintiff for that portion of the harm caused by that defendant. This decides, without elaborating
ajustification, that a plaintiff's harm is divisible, or at least for the purposes of fairness, must be treated as divisible.
Thus, in paying the plaintiff the proportional amount of damages, as determined by degree of fault, a defendant has
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the "deep-pocket" rule, they argued that those entities that were perceived as having
vast resources, whether a city, county or private enterprise, were being singled out
as defendants primarily because of their ability to pay entire judgments. 4 Because
of joint and several liability, these "deep pocket" defendants were forced to bear the
bulk of the financial responsibility for an injury award 5 Moreover, the "deep
pocket" defendant was often minimally culpable; thus, the correlation between what
their degree of culpability suggested they should pay, and what they actually were
required to pay, was dramatically skewed.56 This disparity between degree of
culpability and potential financial liability was the basis for the proponents' of
Proposition 51 argument that the law in California was unfair and needed alteration.
57
Furthermore, the proponents of the initiative drove their point home by stating
that, ultimately, it was the citizens, i.e., the voters, that paid for this inequity.58 A
simple economic equation demonstrated that if cities or businesses were forced to
balanced the scales for that particular portion of the plaintiff's harm, and the mandate of Proposition 51 prevents
that defendant from being held liable for any remaining portions of harm.
This view, however, is exactly contrary to the holding of American Motorcycle. There, the Califomia Supreme
Court specifically addressed the divisibility of a plaintiff's harm in light of comparative fault principles and held
that the ability to proportion fault did not equate to the divisibility of a harm. See supra notes 33-38 and
accompanying text. Proposition 51 overruled this view, but limited its application to non-economic damages, not
because non-economic damages are any more divisible than economic damages, but rather, in furtherance of a
compromise between competing interests.
The practical realities of the compromise enacted by Proposition 51 are that the plaintiff's harm is not in fact
divisible, but when a shortfall in compensation is unavoidable due to insolvency or settlement, the proponents of
the initiative saw it as more fair to split the burden of the shortfall between the plaintiff and the defendants. The line
they chose on which to make the split was the distinction between economic and non-economic damages.
54. See BALLoTPAMPHLE , supra note 41, at 34 (stating that cities, counties and businesses with substantial
insirance coverage are commonly named in suits because of their perceived ability to pay). This argument implies
that any fault attributable to the "deep pocket" defendant is often tenuous, and perhaps exaggerated or even created
by attorneys and plaintiffs in order to secure the purse of that defendant. Whether this is a reality or not, the
proponents of the initiative would nevertheless argue that holding a minimally at-fault defendant liable for the
whole of a damage award was inequitable, even if the fault was clear.
55. See id. (offering a hypothetical situation wherein a defendant city, 5% at fault, is forced to pay the entire
judgment of 1.5 million dollars to a plaintiff injured by an uninsured drunk driver).
56. See id. In their hypothetical, the proponents made the disparity dramatic. Being merely 5% at fault, the
city was required to pay all of the victim's economic damages ($500,000) and all of the non-economic damages
($1,000,000), for a total of $1,500,000. Applying Proposition 51, the hypothetical concluded by showing that the
city would only be required to pay $550,000 ($500,000 economic damages plus 5% of $1,000,000 non-economic
damages, or $50,000), which reflected the proper compromise between the victim's need to be compensated and
the city's need to pay more proportionally to fault. Id. If, and how, the plaintiffwould recover the $950,000 shortfall
in non-economic damages was'not discussed. Similarly, whether the plaintiff was entitled to the shortfall was not
discussed. However, the proponents did claim that, under Proposition 51, a victim would recover all its "actual"
damages. Id. Referring to economic damages, the term "actual" perhaps suggests that non-economic damages arc
somehow less valid, and that any shortfall in a plaintiff's claim for non-economic damages is correspondingly less
troublesome. This, of course, is not expressed, but the implication from the use of the term "actual" in relation to
economic damages is clear.
57. See id.(stating that "[n]othing is more unfair than forcing someone ... to pay for damages that are
someone else's fault.").
58. See id. (sharpening the attack by relating the unfairness of current law to its ultimate victim, the
citizen/voter).
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bear the brunt of financial responsibility for injured plaintiffs, it would not take long
for that expense to be passed on to consumers and citizens in the form of higher
prices and taxes.59 Specifically, the proponents focused on rising insurance costs,
arguing that joint and several liability forced cities to cut back on vital government
services to enable them to afford liability insurance' By limiting the financial
exposure of the perceived "deep pocket" defendants, insurance rates for cities and
private enterprises would naturally decline, which would in turn result in lower taxes
and prices and enhance government services.
Thus, the battlecry was fairness and from the proponents' vantage point, it was
manifestly unfair for the law to require one party to pay for damages that were some-
one else's fault.62 The better view was to compromise, finding a way that the victim
could be equitably compensated, while ensuring that those only partially at fault were
not forced to bear the totality of the financial burden.63 By retaining a plaintiffs
ability to collect all of its economic damages from any defendant, the victim's
interests were protected.6 At the same time, however, "deep pocket" defendants
would no longer be exposed to the potential for total financial liability, which would
save defendants money, and ultimately, save the voters money.65 Based on the notion
that it was unfair to make one person pay for another person's harmful action, a
strong argument was created, particularly when the person who ultimately paid was
the same person entering the voting booth to decide the issue.6
59. Id.
60. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 41, at 33 (codified as CAL. Ctv. CODE § 1431.1(c) (West Supp.
1997)) (stating that because of the soaring costs of lawsuits and rising insurance rates, many cities and counties have
been forced to cut back on police, fire and other essential protections).
61. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 41, at 34 (claiming that the initiative helps private enterprises and
taxpayers alike by reducing insurance rates and preventing the adverse economic effect on cities that must be
recaptured through tax increases).
62. See supra note 57.
63. See BALLOT PAMPHLE, supra note 41, at 34 (claiming that the initiative struck the proper compromise,
mandating fair treatment of defendants, and ultimately the voters, while at the same time protecting the plaintiffs
right to recovery).
64. Id. at 34, 35 (relating a plaintiff's economic damages to "actual" damages, thus implying that non-
economic damages were not "actual," which makes a plaintiff's potential inability to recover non-economic
damages as the result of the initiative's application more justifiable); see also supra note 56.
65. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 41, at 34.
66. The proponents made a strong case. Included in the initiative, and ultimately in the codified statute, were
the following findings and declaration of purpose:
The People of the State of California find and declare as follows:
a) The legal doctrine of joint and several liability, also known as "the deep pocket rule", [sic]
has resulted in a system of inequity and injustice that has threatened financial bankruptcy of local
governments, other public agencies, private individuals and businesses and has resulted in higher
prices for goods and services to the public and in higher taxes to the taxpayers.
b) Some governmental and private defendants are perceived to have substantial financial
resources or insurance coverage and have thus been included in lawsuits even though there was
little or no basis for finding them at fault Under joint and several liability, if they are found to
share even a fraction of the fault, they often are held financially liable for all the damage. The
People--taxpayers and consumers alike-ultimately pay for these lawsuits in the form of higher
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The opponents67 of Proposition 51 also focused their attack on fairness.68
However, it was clear that they would not be able to defeat directly the simplistic
argument of the proponents that fairness meant paying in proportion to fault.69 The
opponents took another path, only briefly arguing that fair allocation of damages was
secondary to a victim's ability to recover.70 Full compensation of an injured victim,
paid by one partially at fault defendant if necessary, should be the primary concern
of the law.7' Contrasting the innocent victim and the tortfeasor, the opponents of
Proposition 51 claimed that existing law put the responsibility right where it
belonged.72
Realizing that this argument could not remove the perceived unfairness of one
defendant paying damages beyond his degree of culpability,73 opponents of
taxes, higher prices and higher insurance premiums.
c) Local governments have been forced to curtail some essential police, fire and other
protections because of the soaring costs of lawsuits and insurance premiums.
Therefore, the People of the State of California declare that to remedy these inequities, defendants in
tort actions shall be held financially liable in closer proportion to their degree of fault. To treat them
differently is unfair and inequitable.
The People of the State of California further declare that reforms in the liability laws in tort actions are
necessary and proper to avoid catastrophic economic consequences for state and local governmental
bodies as well as private individuals and businesses.
BALLOT P.QIp-LET, supra note 41, at 33 (codified as CAL. CiV. CODE § 1431.1 (West Supp. 1997)).
67. Opponents of Proposition 51 included the Asbestos Victims of America, the California Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc., and Ralph Nader, among others. See BALLOT PAMPHLEr, supra note 41, at 34, 35.
68. See BALLOT PAMPHt-.T, supra note 41, at 35 (arguing that fairness means full compensation for the
victims of other's wrongful conduct).
69. See supra notes 52-66 and accompanying text (detailing the proponent's argument that fairness meant
equitable division of payment among culpable defendants).
70. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 41, at 35.
71. See BALLoTPA P supra note 41, at 35 (arguing that denial of full and fair compensation of victims
lets the guilty walk away and that the victim, among all the parties, should not be made to bear the burden of non-
paying defendants); see also Nader, supra note 40 (claiming that Proposition 51 operated to deny every citizen his
right to fair compensation for an injury caused by another).
72. See BALIOT PAMPHLE, supra note 41, at 35 (stating that juries place the responsibility where it belongs
and the law operates to ensure those responsible do not escape unjustifiably). The opponents also alluded to the
position taken by the Supreme Court inAmerican Motorcycle that a plaintiff's harm is not necessarily divisible into
component parts. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. Stating that it is the "involvement of everyone
found guilty that caused [an] accident to occur," opponents argued that joint and several liability functioned exactly
as fairness required. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 41, at 35. Because the victim's harm was the result of a
combination of concurrent actions and events, it did not make sense to allocate damages proportionally based on
the fiction that each event played a correspondingly proportional role in causing the harm. In essence, if all
defendants were removed leaving only the least culpable, the opponents would have argued that the action of that
sole defendant could still have caused the entirety of the plaintiff's harm.
73. The perceived unfairness derives from the assumption that culpability reflects responsibility. A large
portion of the push for tort reform centered on the idea that people, particularly plaintiffs, were not taking
responsibility for their own actions. Plaintiffs too often were running to the courts to blame another for an event
for which they should take some of, if not all of, the responsibility. Thus, when a defendant was required, by joint
and several liability, to pay damages beyond its degree of culpability, the perception was created that the defendant
was being held responsible for another's action. If that defendant was only 20% culpable, someone else must be
responsible for the other 80% of the plaintiff's injury. Closely connected with the idea that harms are divisible, this
perception fit perfectly into the general dissatisfaction with the tort system. It was easy to justify any shortfall the
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Proposition 51 attempted to justify this seeming inequity on another ground. The
opponents argued that holding cities and manufacturers liable under joint and several
liability provided the necessary incentive to ensure safe products and the required
standard of care.74 The corollary to this position is that if the initiative succeeded and
defendants were allowed to escape full liability, more unsafe products and hazardous
conditions in the cities would exist because much of the financial incentive to take
care had been removed. Thus, even if the opponents had to concede the apparent
inequity of joint and several liability in some situations, they argued that the bene-
ficial impact it provided across society justified its retention.75
However, the opponents of Proposition 51 did not confine their argument to
issues of fairness as they related to the functional workings of the legal system. The
primary attack leveled against the initiative was that it took money from deserving
plaintiffs and put it back in the pockets of insurance companies who merely wanted
to avoid paying claims.76 Opponents attacked Proposition 51 as a smoke screen
created by the insurance industry, claiming that the alleged insurance crisis was in
reality an effort by the industry to increase profits:7 The quintessential example of
unfairness was to deny just compensation to an innocent victim for the sole purpose
of fattening the bottom line of a faceless, compassionless insurance company.7
Moreover, opponents argued that Proposition 51 would, in reality, not lower insur-
ance rates and taxes.79 From the opponent's position, the essence of Proposition 51
plaintiff might experience because, once a defendant had paid damages equal to his degree of culpability, it had
satisfied its share of responsibility. Shifting responsibility to another was the evil of the day; thus, it was more
important that a defendant not be forced to pay another's portion than it was to ensure that the plaintiff received
full compensation. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
74. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 41, at 35.
75. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 41, at 35 (stating that existing law worked and was fair, providing
victims needed compensation and big business and cities needed incentives).
76. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 41, at 35; see also Nader, supra note 40.
77. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 41, at 35; see also Robert L. Habush, The Insurance "Crisis":
Reality or Myth?, 64 DENv. U. L. REV. 641, 648 (1988) (claiming that any perceived crisis was created by the
insurance industry to enlarge their profits). The debate whether the insurance crisis was a reality or a creation of
the insurance companies continues. See, e.g., Harry Snyder, The Case Against Auto Insurers, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Mar. 19, 1989, at F1 (suggesting that the crisis behind Proposition 51 was a myth created by the insurance
companies); James P. Sweeney, Some Question Claims of Homeowners-Insurance Crisis, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
June 20, 1995, at C1 (questioning whether the latest insurance crisis is another mirage created by the insurance
companies).
78. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 41, at 35 (boiling the issue down to the burden forced on victims
in favor of the greedy insurance industry).
79. Id. (arguing that the initiative will "solve[ ] nothing" and pointing out, that, although other states had
enacted similar laws, the alleged insurance crisis in those states had not been alleviated). Following passage of
Proposition 51, little actual impact in insurance rates resulted. See Maura Dolan, Numbers Fail to Show Feared
Lawsuit Frenzy, L.A. TIeMs, July 4, 1995, at I (noting that local governments have not felt a reduction in jury
awards or insurance premiums since enactment of Proposition 51); see also Insurance Fees Still Too High, Official
Argues, S. F. CHRON., Dec. 3, 1986, at 19 (quoting an Alameda County Supervisor as being irate enough to consider
suing on the basis of voter fraud).
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was to deny every citizen's right and opportunity to fair compensation for injury in
order to allow insurance companies to avoid paying legitimate claims. 0
Bolstered by the claim that this sacrifice of right and opportunity would provide
no tangible benefits to citizens, opponents argued that the initiative could only harm
the individual.81 Thus, the same voter who proponents claimed ultimately paid for the
effects of joint and several liability would now go to the polls confronted with the
argument that abolishing the alleged source of that expense would have no positive
effect on their wallet and would diminish their protections against wrongdoers at the
same time.
On June 3, 1986, the voters of California spoke, adopting Proposition 51 by a
substantial margin of 62% in favor. 2 Apparently, the argument of proponents that
fairness meant proportional payment by defendants carried the day ! 3 The general
dissatisfaction with the tort system was likely a significant factor as well, as voters
perceived the initiative as an opportunity to partially temper a system viewed as out
of control.'
Soon after its passage, Proposition 51 received challenges regarding its constitu-
tionality and retroactivity, but both challenges were unsuccessful 5 Beginning on
June 4, 1986, individual defendants, in actions involving multiple tortfeasors, were
80. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 41, at 35; Nader, supra note 40.
81. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 41, at 35.
82. See Insurance Changes, supra note 49, at AS0.
83. Whether or not legislation by voter initiative is a desirable process is an open question. See generally
Cynthia L. Fontaine, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating by
Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (1988). Because legislation or court decisions involving tort issues necessarily
involve a balancing of competing public policies, it is facially logical that the general public would be the best body
to decide these issues. However, reaching a well-balanced result requires a requisite level of knowledge regarding
the various factors to be balanced. In the flurry of a campaign, it may often be the case that the true issues are
camouflaged by the partisan arguments presented on either side of an issue. If so, the decision the voters make may
not be based on a thoughtful analysis of competing factors but rather may be based on the results of the superior
marketing campaign. See, e.g., John Marelius, FPPC Crackdown On 'Slate Mailers' Urged By Witnesses, SAN
DIEGo UNioN-TRiB., Dec. 10, 1986, at A3 (discussing the use of inaccurate direct mail materials in the battle over
Proposition 51). This creates a particular danger since, in the realm of tort liability, policies can have significant
adverse impact on parties and society in general. Whether this was the case with Proposition 51 is uncertain, but
the risk was certainly present, as demonstrated by the polarized partisan arguments surrounding the initiative.
84. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text; see also BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 41, at 33 (codified
as CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.1(c) (West Supp. 1997)). Within the Findings and Declaration of Purpose, the following
passage is contained:
The People of the State of California further declare that reforms in the liability laws in tort actions are
necessary and proper to avoid catastrophic economic consequences for state and local governmental
bodies as well as private individuals and businesses.
BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 41, at 33.
Including this passage in the initiative demonstrated the general dissatisfaction with the state of the tort system
at the time the initiative was considered. Proposition 51 was viewed as a step in the right direction.
85. See Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1204, 1226,753 P.2d 585, 595,611,246 Cal. Rptr.
629, 639, 654 (1988) (holding that Proposition 51 was constitutional and that it did not apply retroactively to
injuries that occurred prior to its passage); see also Buttram v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 16 Cal. 4th 520,
941 P.2d 71, 66 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1997) (holding that a latent disease action accrues when the injury is discovered
for purposes of Proposition 51).
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only liable for non-economic damages in proportion to their degree of fault.8 What,
exactly, this meant in practice would be played out in the courts in the years to come.
II. TORRES V. XOMOX CORPORATION
87
A. The Facts
The case involved an accident at a chemical plant in which two maintenance
workers were injured, with one worker dying from his injuries two days after the
accident. 8 The plaintiffs were Richard Sornborger, the surviving injured worker, and
Mildred Torres, plaintiff for the deceased worker, Luis Torres.!9 Defendants in the
action were Xomox Corporation, a valve manufacturer, and Charles Lowe Company,
the distributor of the Xomox valve.9° The worker's employer, Rhone-Poulenc, a
chemical plant that processed sulfuric acid sludge for petroleum refineries, 9' was not
named in the suit as mandated by California law.9 2
The accident occurred during an attempted "line entry" at the chemical plant. 3
Sornborger and Torres were scheduled to replace an "expansion joint" and a
"reducer" that were component parts of a pipeline traveling out of a storage tank con-
taining sulfuric acid sludge. 4 In order to remove and replace these parts, it was
86. The operative provision of the enactment is as follows:
In any action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, based upon principles of
comparative fault, the liability of each defendant for non-economic damages shall be several only and
shall not be joint. Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of non-economic damages
allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault, and a separate
judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for that amount.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West Supp. 1997).
87. 49 Cal. App. 4th 1, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 455 (1996).
88. Id. at 6-11, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459-61.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See CAL. CONST., art. 14, § 4 (authorizing plenary power to the Legislature to implement a system of
worker's compensation); see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West 1997) (implementing the worker's compensation
system, providing for employee recovery for injuries sustained on the job regardless of fault and prohibiting
independent civil suits against an employer by an injured employee in addition to the statutory recovery of
damages); see also Northstar at Tahoe v. W.C.A.B., 42 Cal. App. 4th 1481, 1484, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 475, 476 (1996)
(stating that the statutory right to worker's compensation benefits is exclusive of all other statutory or common law
remedies).
93. Xomox, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 8,56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460. A "line entry" is a procedure in which workers
break into a sealed pipeline in order to replace component parts of the pipeline. The process is broken into three
phases in nonemergency situations: preparation, briefing, and performance. Extreme care is taken to ensure that
the pipeline is shut off upstream from the point of entry and that notice of an impending line entry is obvious in the
area. Once all necessary precautions have been completed, workers are able to break into a sealed pipeline,
removing and replacing component parts, without the fear that the pipeline contains any harmful materials. Plaintiff
Somborger testified that, prior to the accident, he had performed at least three hundred line entries. Torres was also
a senior member of the maintenance staff at Rhone-Poulenc. Id. at 8-11, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459-62.
94. Id. at 8-11, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459-62.
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necessary to break the seal on the pipeline leading from the storage tank.95 Adjacent
to, but upstream from the parts to be replaced (in between those parts and the storage
tank), was a Xomox valve that controlled the flow of the acid. 6 So long as the
integrity of that valve was not disturbed, and the proper precautions were made
ensuring that the valve remained closed, the "line entry" down stream from the valve
could be accomplished without danger to the workers.
As part of the worker's routine maintenance of the pipeline, during a "line entry"
the workers would often replace bolts that had become corroded. 7 This was done,
in part, to maintain the quality of the pipeline, and also to make any future
maintenance of that section of pipeline more convenient 3 In preparation for this
particular "line entry," Somborger and Torres decided to replace some corroded bolts
adjacent to, but downstream from, the Xomox valve. 9 The replacement of these
specific bolts did not cause any danger in itself, as the integrity of the pipeline could
be maintained easily during the process.'°°
However, a bracket that was attached to the Xomox valve was blocking access
to the bolts the workers intended to replace.01 This specific bracket was not the
original bracket provided with the valve by Xomox.1' 2 The valve itself, with all the
original components, was installed in the plant in 1969 by Rhone-Poulenc's pre-
decessor. 10 3 The original bracket was of such design that, had it been attached to the
valve the day Sornborger and Torres were working, their access to the bolts adjacent
to the valve would not have been hindered.104 In 1983, however, the original bracket
had been replaced by Rhone-Poulenc with a replacement bracket obtained from the
defendant distributor, Charles Lowe Company."5 Rhone-Poulenc had ordered a
replacement bracket from the distributor, but Charles Lowe had sent the wrong type
of bracket.'06 Because the bracket they received did not fit the valve, Rhone-Poulenc
cut the bracket apart, welded an additional piece of metal onto it, and then mounted
the bracket onto the Xomox valve.'07 When Sornborger and Tortes went to replace
95. Id.
96. Id. Contained in the same pipeline were the "expansion joint" and "reducer" that were to be replaced
and the Xomox valve. All three components were in close proximity to each other, connected in the pipeline by
another component called a "flange." The parts were spatially related such that the valve was closest to the storage
tank, with the expansion joint and reducer adjacent to, but downstream from, the valve. Thus, since the valve
controlled the flow of acid through the line, if the valve remained closed, the downstream parts could be removed
and replaced safely, with the valve operating to protect the workers from the acid stored in the tank upstream. Id.
97. Id.
98. Xomox, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 8-11, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459-62.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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the bolts on the day of the accident, the altered bracket blocked their access to the
bolts. 08 Had the proper bracket been in place, the workers would have had free
access to the bolts."°
As the situation existed, however, Sornborger and Torres needed to remove the
bracket in order to gain access to the bolts they wanted to replace."0 Unfortunately,
the design of the Xomox valve was such that the same bolt securing the bracket was
the only bolt securing the cover of the valve."' Removal of that bolt, even if only to
remove the bracket, could also loosen the valve cover and destroy the integrity of the
pipeline."' Somborger and Torres proceeded anyway,. and, after loosening the bolt,
attempted to remove the bracket with a series of hammer blows." 4 This successfully
dislodged the bracket, but at the same time, loosened the valve cover, breaking the
seal of the line."5 Sulfuric acid immediately spewed from the valve, forcefully
enough to knock off Sornborger's hat and glasses!1 6 Sornborger and Torres, who
were not wearing any protective clothing,"7 were helicoptered to the hospital."'
Sornborger suffered second and third degree chemical burns over 50% of his body,
and Torres was burned over 90% of his body." 9 Torres died two days after the
accident."2
108. Id. The shape of the altered bracket was such that it extended out on both upstream and downstream
sides of the valve. Id.
109. Id. The altered bracket blocked the downstream bolts, which were the object of the worker's process.
The original bracket, or any bracket not blocking the downstream bolts, would have allowed the workers access
to the bolts without disturbing the bracket or the valve itself. Id.
110. Id.
I11. Id. Xomox's liability in the case was premised on both the design of the valve and its failure to warn
of the potential dangers presented by the design. Id. at 15-21, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462-68. Termed a "single bolt
cover mounted" design, Xomox manufactured these valves for approximately twenty-five years, until switching
to a double bolt design in the mid-1970's. Id. at 13-14, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463. Evidence in the case showed that
the single bolt valve had been determined to be the cause of two or three accidents previous to the accident
involving Somborger and Torres, although Xomox denied having knowledge of the dangers inherent in the design
prior to its switch to the double bolt design. Id. at 12-13, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463.
112. Id. at 8, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460.
113. Id. at 10- 1, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 461-62. Whether the workers realized the danger, or knew that the single
bolt secured both the bracket and the valve cover, was contested at trial. Somborger gave conflicting testimony
regarding his knowledge of the design. Id. at 12, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462. Nevertheless, these were issues for the
jury to consider in apportioning fault and were not necessary for the appellate review of damage allocation.
114. Id. at 11, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. As part of the preparation phase of a "line entry" a permit for the entry is issued by the maintenance
foreman. Id. at 9. 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460. Included in this permit is a list of the protective gear to be worn during
the entry. Id. The protective gear normally required included rubber pants, a rubber coat, gloves and boots, a hard
hat, face shield and respirator. Id. Apparently lulled into a false sense of security by the circumstances of the line
entry, neither Somborger or Torres were wearing protective gear at the time of the accident. Id. at 11, 56 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 462.
118. Id. at 11, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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B. The Verdict
Following a jury trial, a verdict was announced apportioning fault among the
parties to the accident. The plaintiff's employer, Rhone-Poulenc, was found to be
seventy-five percent at fault,'2' although they would not be a factor in the damage
award. 2 The distributor of the valve and bracket, Charles Lowe Company, was
found to be ten percent at fault.'2 Xomox, and the individual plaintiffs, were each
found to be five percent at fault. 24
Following the verdict, plaintiff Somborger settled with both Xomox and Charles
Lowe Company, removing himself from any further litigation."n Torres also settled
with Charles Lowe Company, for four hundred and fifty thousand dollars.12 Because
Torres and Xomox did not reach a settlement, Xomox was left as the sole defendant
subject to judgment in the action.
The special verdict awarded Torres damages totaling $2,056,321127 This total
was divided by the verdict between economic and non-economic damages as follows:
$1,137,073 (55.3%) were economic damages; and $919,248 (44.7%) were non-
economic damages.12 Because of Proposition 51, Xomox would be held jointly and
severally liable for all of the economic damages, but only severally liable for its
portion of non-economic damages. 2 9 As a result, the maximum liability to which
Xomox was exposed, after deductions for Torres' percentage of fault (5%), but prior
to allocation of the settlement proceeds and worker's compensation benefits, was
$1,126,181.75.130
Table 1 - Jury Award and Xomox's Exposure
Total Damages - Jury Verdict $2,056,321.00
Economic Damages $1,137,073.00
121. Id. at 6-7, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459.
122. See infra note 148 (explaining that, under the worker's compensation system, employers are not liable
in a civil action for an employee's injuries).
123. Xomox, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 6-7,56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459.
124. d.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 22,56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469. Torres also received $328,548.85 in worker's compensation benefits
from his employer's insurer. Id.
127. Id. at 21-22,56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 468-69.
128. Id.
129. See supra notes 39-86 and accompanying text (detailing the provisions of Proposition 51 and the
changes it created in the doctrine ofjoint and several liability).
130. Xomox, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 22, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469. This figure is arrived at by the following
calculation:
Xomox is jointly and severally liable for all of Torres' economic damages, less Torres' 5% fault, or
$1,080,219.35; Xomox is severally liable for its percentage of non-economic damages, as determined by
comparative fault, or 5% of $919,248, equaling $45,962.40. Adding the two figures together, the figure
$1,126,181.75 is produced.
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Non-Economic Damages $ 919,248.00
Xomox's Maximum Liability (less Torres' 5% fault)
Economic Damages $1,080,219.35
Non-Economic Damages $ 45.962.40
(5% of $919,248)
Xomox's Total Exposure $1,126,181.75
How the settlement proceeds and worker's compensation benefits were allocated
between economic and non-economic damages would determine the full extent of
Xomox's liability.
Prior to Proposition 51, any settlement proceeds or worker's compensation bene-
fits could simply be deducted from the entire award, leaving the jointly and severally
liable defendant paying the difference. 131 However, after Proposition 51, settlement
proceeds or worker's compensation benefits allocated to economic damages could
significantly reduce the liability of the remaining defendant by lowering the amount
for which he could be held jointly and severally liable.1 32 Because the defendant
could not be held accountable for non-economic damages beyond his percentage of
fault, proceeds or benefits allocated to non-economic damages did not help the
defendant's position,133 but rather correspondingly reduced the amount of credit the
defendant could potentially receive towards the joint and several liability portion of
the judgment.134 Naturally, the plaintiff's interests were exactly contrary to the defen-
dant's, as the higher the amount of settlement or worker's compensation proceeds
allocated to non-economic damages, the more economic damages the plaintiff could
collect from the jointly and severally liable defendant. Thus, the court's distribution
of the post-verdict settlement and worker's compensation proceeds between eco-
nomic and non-economic damages would significantly impact, and could potentially
alter, the situation for many parties in the future.
131. Absent demarcation between economic and non-economic damages, any proceeds a plaintiff received,
either by settlement or worker's compensation, would simply be deducted from the total judgment since the total
judgment is a single amount, not the sum of two categories of damages.
132. Settlement proceeds or worker's compensation benefits a plaintiff received that are deemed economic
damages are offset against the economic damage portion of the award. Because the remaining defendant is only
jointly and severally liable for the economic portion of damages, any credit to that portion lowers the defendants
total liability correspondingly.
133. Proposition 51 ensured that defendants only could be held liable for non-economic damages in
proportion to their percentage of fault. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text. Thus, any monies allocated
to non-economic damages will not lower a defendant's liability, as Proposition 51 has already established a limit
to the non-economic damages portion of any defendant's liability.
134. Any part of settlement proceeds or worker's compensation benefits that is credited to non-economic
damages is obviously not available to help offset the economic portion of the award, thus the economic portion of
the award remains higher.
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III. ALLOCATION OF DAMAGES
A. The Method Adopted
Following the jury verdict, the trial court allocated the worker's compensation
benefits and the Charles Lowe settlement money using the same approach for both. 35
Using what is termed the "Espinoza method,' ' t36 the trial court divided the monies
into economic and non-economic damages based on the proportion of each within
the total judgment, as determined by the jury. 37 Of the total judgment, 55.3% were
economic damages and 44.7% were non-economic damages.' 38 Thus, the worker's
compensation benefits and the settlement proceeds were divided under the Espinoza
approach by the same percentages, allocating 55.3% of each category to economic
damages and 44.7% of each to non-economic damages. 39 By calculating these
amounts, the specific dollar amount of economic damages within the settlement and
worker's compensation proceeds was determined. That dollar amount, then, was
credited against Xomox's joint and several liability which remained following the
judgment.
135. Torres v. Xomox Corp., 49 Cal. App. 4th 1, 23-24, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 455, 469-70 (1996).
136. See Espinoza v. Machonga, 9 Cal. App. 4th 268, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498 (1992).
137. Xomox, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 23-24, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469-70. The Espinoza method is a straight forward
and logical approach to the division of damages between economic and non-economic portions. The specific
percentages of each category are derived easily from the verdict since the jury assigns economic and non-economic
damage amounts which combine to create the total verdict. These percentages are then applied to the settlement
or worker's compensation benefit in question, thus arriving at the dollar amounts to be categorized as economic
or non-economic damages. By using this method, consistency among the various awards is maintained and
discrepancies between recovery and over-payment are evenly distributed among the parties.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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Table2 - The Espinoza Method
Worker's Compensation Benefit
*Economic (55.3%)
Non-Economic (44.7%)
Charles Lowe Settlement
*Economic (55.3%)
Non-Economic (44.7%0
Xomox's Economic Damage Liability
Total Exposure
*Less Credits
Worker's Compensation
Charles Lowe Settlement
Net Joint and Several Liability
$ 328,548.85
$ 181,687.51
$ 146,861.34
$ 450,000.00
$ 248,850.00
$ 201,150.00
$1,080,219.35
181,687.51
248,850.00
$ 649,681.85
Under this approach, the settlement proceeds were credited against the judgment
to Xomox's disadvantage. Charles Lowe's liability for non-economic damages,
under the application of Proposition 51, should have been limited to 10% of the total
non-economic damage award of $919,248.00, or $91,924.80.140 If the trial court had
used this method, a remainder of $358,075.20 from the $450,000 settlement would
have been deemed economic damages, and would have been credited against the total
amount of economic damages.14' This, in turn, would naturally reduce the extent of
Xomox's joint and several liability by that amount.
Under the trial court's approach, 44.7% of the settlement money, or $201,150.00,
was allocated to non-economic damages, leaving only $248,850.00 available to
reduce Xomox's liability for economic damages. 4 (See Table 2). The same method
of division was utilized with regard to the worker's compensation benefits.'
Naturally, because Xomox believed it had been required to pay economic damages
beyond what the law mandated, an appeal followed.
140. Id. at 39, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 480. Because Charles Lowe was 10% at fault, Lowe's liability for non-
economic damages, under Proposition 51, was a maximum of 10% of the total non-economic damage award.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 30-31, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474-75.
1997/Torres v. Xomox
Upon review, the appellate court analyzed the trial court's allocation method,
dealing with each category of monies separately. Beginning with the worker's com-
pensation benefits, the appellate court searched for the proper allocation method,
considering its practical effects in light of the mandate of Proposition 51.144 Deter-
mination of the proper allocation method required the court to balance Proposition
5 I's mandate that defendants pay in closer proportion to their degree of fault with the
plaintiffs interest in obtaining full recovery. 145
1. The Worker's Compensation Benefits
Ultimately, the appellate court adopted the trial court's method of allocation for
the worker's compensation benefits.'4 The appellate court found that the Espinoza
approach was the proper method of division, based on the notion that worker's
compensation benefits were a hybrid of economic and non-economic damages. ta
Because worker's compensation benefits represent the entire recovery an injured
worker can collect from an employer," the court concluded that those benefits con-
tained elements of economic and non-economic damages. t49 Xomox argued that
worker's compensation benefits were solely economic in nature, and as such, should
be credited in full against the economic portion of the judgment. 5 However, the
144. Id. at 25-37, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470-79.
145. See supra Part I.B. (discussing the balance of interests at stake under Proposition 51).
146. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (explaining the Espinoza method adopted by the trial court).
147. The court declined to label worker's compensation benefits "damages," stating that they were different
from traditional common law damages. Xomox, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 37,56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478-79. Although this
distinction is valid, in real terms a plaintiff receiving worker's compensation benefits is receiving damages, at least
in the situation where an employer is at fault to some degree. Because any worker's compensation benefits paid
must be accounted for in a civil suit for injuries, the practical effect of those benefits is the same whether they are
labeled damages or not.
148. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997). Worker's compensation is a statutory scheme
providing recovery to injured workers regardless of employer culpability. As such, it is a legislative determination
of the proper compensation based on particular injuries, providing an injured worker certain recovery for injuries
sustained on the job. The worker is provided this recovery, while at the same time the employer is protected from
further liability in civil proceedings. In this manner, an employer can obtain worker's compensation insurance and
be certain that no further liability will attach. In gaining this certainty, however, the employer is required to pay for
injuries even if not at fault. This compromise provides the worker with benefits for an injury but necessarily
precludes further action against the employer in order to justify requiring employer payment without a showing of
culpability. Thus, the statutory scheme provides a certain level of compensation in all cases, meeting the worker's
need for payment, but also limits employer exposure to liability, which protects employers and the courts from
litigation expense. See Langridge v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 25 Cal. App. 4th 664, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34 (1994)
(noting that the worker's compensation system is a statutory compromise imposing liability on an employer
regardless of fault in exchange for immunity (except under specific circumstances) from civil suit).
149. Xomox, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 37,56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478-79.
150. Id. at 26-28, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471-72. The argument focussed on the terminology in the worker's
compensation statutes in comparison to the definition of economic damages in Proposition 51. Central to the
argument was the notion that worker's compensation benefits are based on "objectively verifiable" damages, which
also capsulizes the definition of economic damages under Proposition 51. Xomox contended, therefore, that, under
the spirit of Proposition 51, worker's compensation benefits were more properly considered entirely economic
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court settled on the Espinoza method of allocation, concluding that that method
distributed the benefits most equitably between the affected parties.' (See Table 2).
Under the worker's compensation statutes, the plaintiff is foreclosed from
bringing a civil suit against an employer for damages beyond the benefits paid under
the statute, even if the employer is at fault.' The civil recovery system, of course,
differentiates between economic and non-economic damages and allows an injured
plaintiff to recovery both categories of damages if appropriate. Thus, if the entire
amount of worker's compensation proceeds were in fact economic damages, this
would, in effect, deny the plaintiff recovery of non-economic damages that would be
due from a culpable employer if the worker was permitted to pursue civil recovery.' 53
Therefore, the court concluded that those benefits must represent a policy
compromise that in essence accounts for both economic and non-economic com-
pensation. 4 To hold otherwise would be, in essence, stating that where an employer
is at fault to some degree, the injured worker is not entitled to non-economic
damages at all.155 This result would be at tension with the accepted forms of damage
recovery available under civil recovery. Because the Legislature has completely
displaced the civil recovery system with the statutory worker's compensation system
in situations involving injured employees, it was reasonable to the court to conclude
that the statutory recovery system must have incorporated non-economic damage
elements as well as economic.5 6
2. The Settlement Proceeds
Addressing the settlement proceeds next, the appellate court rejected the
allocation method adopted by the trial court. 57 The trial court had employed the
Espinoza method in dividing the settlement proceeds, just as it had in allocating the
worker's compensation benefits.' 8 This resulted in 55.3% of the proceeds being
credited against the economic portion of the judgment, thereby reducing Xomox's
compensation, rather than a combination of economic and non-economic. Id.
151. Id. at 37, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478-79.
152. See supra note 148 (discussing the Worker's Compensation scheme in California).
153. If the entire worker's compensation benefit is economic, and the worker is not allowed to take action
against the employer beyond that statutory compensation, then the statute has the effect of barring non-economic
recovery for an injured employee against an employer.
154. Xomox, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 31-32, 37, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474-75, 478-79.
155. This can be seen by imagining an employer could be held liable in suit. If so, the injured worker would
be entitled to non-economic damages, as in any other situation. But, because the employee cannot pursue the
employer, the worker's compensation benefits must represent the whole recovery to which the employee is entitled.
If allocated totally as economic damages, this is the same as statutorily stating that an injured employee is not
entitled to non-economic damages from his employer.
156. Xomox, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 31-32, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474-75.
157. Id. at 39-40, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 480-81.
158. Id.
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liability correspondingly. 59 However, this left 44.7% of the money allocated as non-
economic damages attributable to Charles Lowe, the settling defendant." ° When
viewed under the mandates of Proposition 51, this created a surplus of $109,225.20
of non-economic damages, which in turn left Xomox paying that amount as part of
its joint and several liability.' 6
Table 3- Charles Lowe's Non-Economic Damages Under Proposition 51
Total Non-Economic Damages - Jury $919,248.00
Charles Lowe % Fault 10%
Prop. 51 Non-Economic Liability $ 91,924.80
Espinoza Method - Non-Economic Liability
(See Table 2) $201,150.00
Surplus Non-Economic Damages
Under Espinoza $109,225.20
The appellate court recognized this inequity and overturned the result. The court
pointed out that Charles Lowe was liable for a maximum of $91,924.80 in non-
economic damages, according to the verdict when calculated under Proposition 51.162
Thus, dividing the settlement proceeds using the Espinoza method allotted too much
settlement money to non-economic damages and left Xomox liable for more than its
appropriate share of the economic damages.'63 (See Table 3).
The court created its own method of allocation that it termed the "ceiling
approach."' 4 Under the "ceiling approach," the settlement proceeds are allocated as
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. The fundamental mandate of Proposition 51 was that no defendant be held liable for more than his
proportionate share of non-economic damages as determined by comparative fault principles. See supra Part I.B.
(discussing the campaign for and eventual enactment of Proposition 51). Thus, because Charles Lowe was 10% at
fault, the maximum extent of its non-economic liability should have been $91,924.80. By using the Espinoza
approach, $109,225.20 more was allocated to Charles Lowe's non-economic liability, thus lowering the reduction
effect the settlement had on Xomox's liability of economic damages as the remaining defendant. This, in effect,
provided the plaintiff with a double recovery because Xomox paid the $109,225.20 as economic damages and
Torres collected the same amount from Lowe as surplus non-economic damages. See Xomox, 49 Cal. App. 4th at
39, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 480.
162. Xomox, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 39, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 480.
163. Id.
164. Id. at4O-42, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 481-82. Another method of allocation considered by the appellate court
was the proportional method advanced by Xomox. Xomox argued that, because the extent of Charles Lowe's
liability was known at the time of settlement, the settlement proceeds should be divided in proportions equal to the
ratio of Lowe's potential liability for economic and non-economic damages had they not settled. In this case, those
proportions would have been 92.2% economic damages ($1,080,219.25 of $1,172,144.15 total exposure) and 7.8%
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non-economic damages up to the maximum liability of the settling defendant, as
determined by degree of fault.'t This method, the court concluded, was consistent
with Proposition 51 in that it fully accounted for the entire extent of a settling
defendant's non-economic liability, without creating a situation in which a double
recovery was possible. 16
In this case, $91,924.80 of the $450,000.00 settlement was deemed non-
economic damages by the appellate court, representing the entirety of the settling
defendant's non-economic liability.167 The remainder was termed economic damages
and credited against the judgment rendered against Xomox, thus reducing the extent
of Xomox's joint and several liability correspondingly. 1"
Table 4 - The Ceiling Approach (Settlement Proceeds)
Settlement Amount $ 450,000.00
Non-Economic Damages
Under Proposition 51 $ 91,924.80
Economic Damages $ 358,075.20
Xomox's Joint and Several Liability
Total Exposure (economic) $1,080,219.35
Less Credits (economic)
Worker's Comp. (Espinoza) $ 181,687.51
Settlement (Ceiling) $ 358.075.20
Net Joint and Several Liability $ 540,456.64
non-economic damages ($91,924.80 of $1,172,144.15 of total exposure). Thus, under this method, 92.2% of
$450,000 would be termed economic damages ($414,900) and 7.8% would be non-economic ($35,100). This
method would have been most favorable to Xomox, producing a $414,900 reduction of its joint and several liability,
leaving it jointly and severally liable for $483,631.84 after all credits are taken. This concept also has an internal
consistency which is attractive, particularly because the settlement is post-verdict. Because the potential exposure
for economic and non-economic damages is known to both settling parties at the time of the settlement, it is
arguably fair to impose corresponding ratios onto that settlement for allocation purposes.
165. Id.
166. Id. The trial court's method created a double recovery for the plaintiff. By allocating the $109,225.20
surplus to Lowe's non-economic damages, Xomox was required to pay $109,225.20 more in economic damages
than it would have if Lowe's non-economic damages had been limited to 10% of the non-economic award. Thus,
the plaintiff collected the $109,000 as non-economic damages from Lowe and collected $109,225.20 again as part
of the economic damages paid by Xomox.
167. Id. at 42, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482.
168. Id.
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By using this method, the plaintiff was given full compensation for the settling
defendant's non-economic liability, and the non-settling defendant, Xomox, re-
mained jointly and severally liable for a lesser amount of economic damages.
Furthermore, the plaintiff would still fully recover because Xomox would be required
to pay the entire economic portion of the judgment.
IV. WERE THE ALLOCATION METHODS APPROPRIATE?
A. Worker's Compensation
The enactment of Proposition 51 created new problems for damage allocation by
requiring consideration of the two distinct categories of damages (economic and non-
economic) and their application to individual defendants. 69 Additionally, the
initiative created new confusion in the arena of worker's compensation because the
statutory system for worker's compensation does not recognize any distinction
between types of damages. Worker's compensation benefits are not classified in the
statutes as partially economic and partially non-economic."' 0 They are simply the
total benefits available to an injured worker."' This clash between Proposition 51
and worker's compensation necessitated the appellate interpretation undertaken in
Xomox.
Labeling worker's compensation damages as wholly one or the other (economic
or non-economic damages) is logically inconsistent with their purpose. Clearly,
worker's compensation benefits are not solely non-economic damages. The basis for
damage benefits is injury in the workplace, and a significant portion of the rationale
for the statutory recovery is to compensate for the loss of earning capacity due to the
workplace injury. 172 As such, worker's compensation benefits must possess a strong
economic element.
However, classifying the benefits as solely economic would be inconsistent with
the goals of tort recovery in general. Injured persons are compensated by the tort
system in an effort to make them whole, as well as to provide deterrent incentives to
all potential tortfeasors, among other considerations. ' 73 This compensation has
evolved to include an element for non-economic damages, commonly classified as
a "pain and suffering" classification. 74 Labeling worker's compensation benefits as
entirely economic ignores the non-economic elements of compensation that have
developed in the tort system. This is so because the worker's compensation system
169. See supra Part I.B.
170. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3207,3209 (West Supp. 1997) (defining "compensation" for purposes within
the statutory system, and distinguishing "damages" which are available in an action at law).
171. See id. § 3207 (West Supp. 1997).
172. See id. §§ 4451-53 (West Supp. 1997) (detailing the compensation formulas based on annual average
earnings of the injured employee).
173. See generally JAMES R. ADAMS, TORTS ILLUSTRATED-PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS (1997.98 ed.).
174. Id.
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entirely replaces an injured worker's avenue for recovery against an employer for
that injury.175 The statutory system displaces the normal tort recovery system, pro-
viding compensation for the injury, regardless of fault, but also precluding civil
recovery against an employer in the event of fault.176 The system provides certainty
and clarity.
However, because it entirely replaces the common law tort recovery system, it
is reasonable to assume that it encompasses all the elements of tort compensation,
including both economic and non-economic damages. Thus, when an injured em-
ployee collects under an employer's worker's compensation coverage, that recovery
necessarily accounts for the worker's economic and non-economic damages.
Concluding otherwise creates an inconsistency without a policy justification because
the employee is statutorily barred from recovering whatever damages are not con-
sidered part of the worker's compensation benefits. 177 If worker's compensation
benefits were deemed entirely economic, the statutory system would deny the injured
party just recovery of non-economic damages from an employer. It seems unlikely
that this is the intent of the worker's compensation system.
When considering allocation of damages, therefore, the court's conclusion that
the Espinoza method best divides worker's compensation benefits seems appropriate.
Taking the jury's determination of the respective amounts of economic and non-
economic damages, it is reasonable to transpose that ratio on to the worker's com-
pensation benefits. If a plaintiff has sustained 60% economic damages and 40% non-
economic damages, it is logical to assume that any worker's compensation benefits
collected, which represent the entire amount recoverable from an employer,
correspond to those percentages.
Utilizing this method does not take into consideration the fundamental require-
ment of Proposition 51 that a culpable party pay non-economic damages solely in
proportion to degree of fault.17 Where the employer is culpable, the worker's
compensation benefits may or may not be sufficient to totally compensate for what
would be the employer's non-economic liability under Proposition 51.179 However,
because the worker's compensation system does not account for fault, and because
it precludes an employer from being a potentially liable defendant in suit, the
mandate of Proposition 51 can never be fully reconciled with the worker's
175. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West Supp. 1997); supra note 148 (discussing the California Worker's
Compensation system).
176. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West Supp. 1997).
177. It is conceivable that the Legislature could intentionally preclude injured workers from recovering non-
economic damages. However, it seems very unlikely that they would do so without expressly saying so, and in
particular, without expressing a reason why.
178. The worker's compensation system does not incorporate fault. Thus, because the employer's fault is not
considered in calculating worker's compensation recovery, the proportionality requirements of Proposition 51
cannot be consistently integrated into the worker's compensation system.
179. This, of course, depends entirely on the percentage of fault assigned to the employer and its proportional
relation to the amount recovered under worker's compensation.
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compensation system. At best, the statutory benefit can be divided proportionately
between economic and non-economic damages, thus representing both elements of
the employee's recovery entitlement from the employer. The potential inconsistency
between the plaintiff's recovery of non-economic damages under worker's com-
pensation and the employer's degree of culpability represents a policy compromise
which operates to best implement an exclusive compensation system. In this way, the
allocation method adopted by the court creates a consistency that best resolves the
conflict between Proposition 5 I's insistence that non-economic damages be propor-
tional to degree of fault and the worker's compensation system where an employer's
fault is not a consideration.
B. The Settlement Proceeds
In contrast to worker's compensation benefits, settlement proceeds can be
logically divided into economic and non-economic classifications. The settlor is a
named defendant in the suit, and absent the settlement, the settlor would be liable in
judgment for his proportionate amount of non-economic damages, as well as
potential full liability for economic damages. By virtue of the settlement, the settlor
escapes judgment. The allocation of the settlement proceeds, however, has a signi-
ficant impact on the judgment and the non-settling defendant.
As the court noted, utilization of the Espinoza method regarding settlement
proceeds creates the potential for double recovery by the plaintiff, where the settle-
ment amount is large enough to create a surplus of non-economic damages. 80 For
this reason, the court adopted its "ceiling approach," which ensures that the plaintiff
will not recover more in non-economic damages from the settlement than that
amount proportional to the settlor's degree of fault. This method also ensures that the
excess settlement proceeds beyond the amount of non-economic damages are avail-
able as an offset against the economic judgment for which a non-settling defendant
remains liable.
However, the distinguishing characteristic of the Xomox situation is that the
settlement was reached following the verdict.' 8' In this situation, both the plaintiff
and the settling defendant knew at the time of settlement the exact amount of liability
in non-economic damages and the amount of potential liability for economic
damages, although they could not be certain how the court would allocate the settle-
ment proceeds.8 2 However, with the precedent Xomox creates, post-verdict settle-
ments will now be allocated using the "ceiling approach." Thus, future plaintiffs and
defendants wishing to settle will be able to calculate the amount of the non-economic
180. See supra note 161 (noting that, in the trial court's allocation method had provided Torres with a double
recovery).
181. Xomox, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 37-38,56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479.
182. Id.
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liability as determined by the verdict and the affect the apportionment of any
settlement will be given.
In the Xomox case, the settlement was adequate to provide money beyond
Lowe's proportional non-economic liability, 83 but this may not always be the case.
Particularly, the knowledge that the court will apply settlement proceeds toward non-
economic damages until the complete proportion of the settling defendant's non-
economic liability is satisfied may create situations whereby the non-settling defen-
dant is disadvantaged by virtue of the allocation method. A plaintiff will have no
incentive to demand a settlement beyond the non-economic liability of a settling
defendant if the plaintiff knows that the non-settling defendant will be required to
pay the entire economic portion of the judgment. Although these basic rules of joint
and several liability cannot be altered by a court, the allocation method can be altered
to provide the proper incentives for more equitable settlements.
The adverse potential of the ceiling approach can be seen in the following
hypothetical (hypothetical 1). Assume two defendants are jointly and severally liable
to a single plaintiff, whose damages are one million dollars economic damages and
five hundred thousand dollars non-economic damages, as determined by the jury.
Defendant A is found 30% at fault and defendant B is 70% at fault.184 Under
Proposition 51, defendant A would be liable for $150,000 non-economic damages
(30% of $500,000), with defendant B liable for $350,000 in non-economic damages
(70% of $500,000). Both are potentially jointly and severally liable for one million
dollars in economic damages. All parties are aware of the extent of the liability and
of the ceiling approach to allocation of settlement proceeds.
Table 5- Hypothetical 1
Damages
Economic $1,000,000.00
Non-Economic $ 500,000.00
Total Damages $1,500,000.00
Defendant A's Exposure (30% at fault)
Economic $1,000,000.00
Non-Economic $ 150,000.00
Defendant B's Exposure (70% at fault)
Economic $1,00000.00
183. With Lowe being liable for 10% of $919,248, or $91,924.80, in non-economic damages, the $450,000
settlement was more than sufficient to cover Lowe's non-economic liability.
184. For simplicity, assume that the plaintiff was not culpable and that no employer was involved, thus no
worker's compensation set-off is involved.
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Non-Economic $ 350,000.00
Under this scenario, both defendants have the incentive to settle as close as
possible to their respective liability for non-economic damages. Each defendant is
aware that if it does not settle and the other defendant does, it will be jointly and
severally liable for the entire economic judgment, less the set-off from the settlement
surplus beyond the non-economic liability of the settlor. The plaintiff has the
incentive to settle with one or the other, but not both. The plaintiff's incentive is to
settle with the least solvent defendant, knowing the remaining, more solvent defen-
dant will be saddled with the judgment from which the plaintiff can fully recover.
More importantly, the plaintiff has no incentive to demand a settlement beyond the
non-economic portion of the settlor's liability. Because the ceiling approach will be
used to allocate the settlement proceeds, any settlement money beyond the non-
economic liability of the settlor will be off-set against the economic portion of the
judgment. This excess reduces the liability of the non-settling defendant, but does not
alter the plaintiffs recovery (assuming the solvency of the non-settling defendant).
Thus, the plaintiff's only requirement is to settle for the equivalent of the non-
economic liability of the least solvent defendant. Simultaneously, the defendants will
each race to settle so that they are not the remaining defendant subject to the judg-
ment because the judgment will include the remainder of the economic liability of
both defendants."l5 Although the ceiling approach encourages settlement in this
situation, it encourages settlements based solely on self-interest; both the plaintiff and
the settling defendant reach their agreement out of their own best interest. The non-
settling defendant is thus left paying the bulk of the damages, contrary to the spirit
of Proposition 51.186
In support of the ceiling approach, the court noted that post-verdict settlements
do not create immunity from contribution (or equitable indemnity under American
MotorcyclelrT) for the settling defendant!"8 Under California Code of Civil Procedure
§ 877, settling defendants are only immune from contribution actions by co-
defendants for settlements prior to verdict or judgment.'89 Similarly, the decision in
American Motorcycle does not prevent an equitable indemnity action against settling
185. Of course, a rorollary to the race to settle between the defendants is that the race itself might drive up
the price of the settlement. With each defendant eager to avoid joint and several liability, the settlement offers may
rise as they compete with each other to be the winner of the settlement race. If this occurred, the adverse incentives
the ceiling approach creates for the plaintiff may be partially offset.
186. See supra Part I.B. (discussing the primary intent of Proposition 51 as creating a mechanism by which
defendants will pay damage amounts more closely correlating to their individual degree of culpability).
187. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
188. Xomox, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 39, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 480.
189. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1997).
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defendants in the post-verdict situation.'90 Thus, a post-verdict settlement does not
provide the settling defendant protection against collateral action by the non-settling
defendant, which in theory lessens the inequity to the non-settling defendant from a
shortfall in the settlement amount.191
However, because defendant solvency will be the primary characteristic con-
sidered by the plaintiff in choosing with whom to settle, any future right to con-
tribution may be essentially meaningless." z Moreover, an allocation method should
not unnecessarily create additional litigation if it is avoidable initially. Thus, the
availability of future contribution actions by the non-settling defendant does not
satisfactorily answer the problems created by the ceiling approach to allocation of
post-verdict settlements. 193
The better method of allocating post-verdict settlement proceeds would seem to
be a modified approach to the method advanced by Xomox. Xomox contended that
the settlement proceeds should be divided between economic and non-economic
damages in the same proportions as the verdict established the settling defendant's
potential liability. 94 This method takes the known economic and non-economic
liability of the settling defendant and translates these amounts into ratios. For
example (call this hypothetical 2), if a defendant is liable for $100 in non-economic
damages and potentially liable for a judgment of $400 in economic damages (the
total economic damage award), the resulting ratio would produce 20% non-economic
damage liability ($100 of a total exposure of $500) and 80% economic damage
liability ($400 of a total exposure of $500). These percentages are then imposed on
the settlement amount, with 20% of the settlement deemed non-economic and 80%
deemed economic damages. The rationale behind this allocation is that both parties,
the plaintiff and the settling defendant, know at the time they reach the settlement the
maximum extent of the settling defendant's liability. It is therefore reasonable to
assume that in negotiating the settlement, the plaintiff takes into account the pro-
190. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578,604,578 P.2d 899,915-16, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 182, 198-99 (1978) (adopting the same settlement bar as found in CAL. Civ. CODE § 877 which does not bar
contribution actions against post-verdict settlors).
191. Since the non-settling defendant can pursue the settlor in a contribution or equitable indemnity action,
the inequity possibly created by the ceiling approach can be remedied in the subsequent action.
192. See supra note 38 (discussing that defendant insolvency, or finite resources, will often make an available
contribution or equitable indemnity action meaningless).
193. It should be noted that the Espinoza method is the accepted allocation method for pre-verdict
settlements. See Xomox, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 37-38, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479. With pre-verdict settlements, the parties
are dealing with unknowns and more flexibility is justifiable in allocating these settlement proceeds. If a pre-verdict
settlement is insufficient to equitably reduce the liability of a non-settling defendant under the Espinoza method,
it is reasonable to declare this shortfall part of the price of refusing to settle. Moreover, the settling defendant bears
less condemnation for the shortfall, as does the plaintiff, since prior to the verdict, the settling parties are each
gambling that they may not achieve a settlement advantageous to their sides. Because of the additional variables
involved, and to encourage settlement prior to protracted litigation, surpluses and shortfalls are tolerated with pre-
verdict settlements as long as they meet the "good faith" standard. See Tech-built, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde &
Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
194. See Xonox, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 38-39,56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 480; supra note 164.
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portions of economic and non-economic damages to which that defendant is exposed.
Thus, a straight proportional division of the settlement is justified since the parties
were negotiating with known liabilities.
Applied to hypothetical 1 above, this method advocated by Xomox would derive
the following results. After the verdict, but prior to settlement, defendant A had
potential liability equaling $150,000 for non-economic damages and $1,000,000 in
economic damages, for a total potential exposure of $1,150,000. (See Table 5). The
proportion of defendant A's non-economic exposure is thus 13.1% and its economic
exposure is 86.9%. Under the method advanced by Xomox, any settlement reached
between defendant A and the plaintiff would be allocated in the same ratios, with
13.1% allocated to non-economic damages and 86.9% allocated as economic
damages. This amount, the 86.9% economic damages, would then be credited against
the economic portion of the judgment for which the non-settling defendant remains
liable. Because both settling parties were working with known liability proportions,
the argument concludes that they should be held to those proportions. 95
The results under this method, however, are too harsh on the negotiating parties,
particularly the plaintiff, and as such, will not encourage settlement. If the plaintiff
settles with defendant A for as much as $575,000 (half of the full potential liability),
the plaintiff forever loses a portion of his non-economic recovery. (This result
becomes even harsher when it is noted that it would be extremely unusual for a
settlement to reach the level of half the full potential liability in a multiple defendant
situation). Applying this method advanced by Xomox, 13.1% of $575,000 would be
allocated to defendant A's non-economic liability with the remainder being credited
towards the full economic damages judgment. The result would be that the plaintiff
would collect $75,325 in non-economic damages from defendant A, and the
remaining $499,675 would be termed economic damages and credited against the
judgment against defendant B. This would leave defendant B paying its full non-
economic liability ($350,000), but only paying $500,325 in economic damages
($1,000,000 economic damages less $499,675 credit from the settlement). More
importantly, the plaintiff has lost the ability to collect the $74,675 shortfall from the
non-economic damages award ($150,000) against defendant A. In short, the only
way the plaintiff can ever recover the full non-economic damages amount from a
settling defendant is to settle for the full amount of that defendant's potential liability,
both economic and non-economic, which will never be the case.
195. See id.
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Table 6 - Xomox's Ratio Method Applied to Settlement With Defendant A
(Hypothetical 1)
Defendant A's Total Exposure
Economic $1,000,000.00
Non-Economic $ 150,000.00
Total Exposure $1,150,000.00
Ratios for Damage Allocation
Economic 89%
Non-Economic 13.1%
Settlement Amount $ 575,000.00
Economic $ 499,675.00
Non-Economic Portion $ 75,325.00
(13.1% of $575,000)
Plaintiff's Shortfall in Non-Economic Damages
Defendant A's Exposure $ 150,000.00
Collected in Settlement $ 75,325.00
Shortfall $ 74,675.00
The drawback to this method is not that it provides a shortfall to the plaintiff in
non-economic damage recovery.1  Some shortfall seems justifiable where the plain-
tiff is settling post-verdict, since all the liabilities are known and little litigation has
been avoided. However, this method ignores the fact that defendant A remains jointly
and severally liable along with defendant B prior to the settlement. Rather than using
the entire economic damage amount to calculate a settling defendant's total potential
exposure, it would be more equitable to divide the economic damages among all
defendants (two in this hypothetical) for the purposes of calculating allocation ratios.
The settling defendant's non-economic liability should be added to its pro rata share
of the total economic damages when calculating that defendant's potential damage
liability with which the allocation ratios are derived.1 97 In this way, a more realistic
196. Proposition 51 by its terms envisioned that the plaintiff would bear some of the burden of a more
equitable allocation of damages. As with any balancing of interests, Proposition 51 sacrificed some of a plaintiff's
ability to fully recover so that defendants would be held liable in closer relation to their individual degree of fault.
197. For example, in hypothetical 2, the following would result. The defendant remains liable for $100 non-
economic damages, but is now, pro rata, potentially liable for only $200 in economic damages. Thus, the
percentages used to allocate the settlement money would be 33.3% non-economic damages ($100 of $300 total
potential pro rata exposure) and 66.7% economic damages ($200 of $300 total potential pro rata exposure). In this
way, the plaintiff's shortfall in collecting the non-economic damage portion of the settling defendant's liability is
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number is utilized to derive the ratios by which the settlement proceeds will be
allocated. If allocation is to be based on the realities of the negotiation and what the
parties know when they enter negotiations, a more realistic total for the settling
defendant's total exposure is required. Because the settling defendant is not the sole
defendant, thepro rata calculation of potential liability more realistically reflects the
settlor's liability.
Applying this pro rata ratio method to hypothetical 1 results in the following
allocation. Defendant A's exposure is $150,000 for non-economic damages just as
before, but the pro rata method reduces Defendant A's potential economic liability
to $500,000 (defendant A's half of $1,000,000). Thus, defendant A's realistic total
exposure prior to settlement is $650,000. Thus, defendant A's non-economic liability
is 23.1% of the damages and its economic liability is 76.9%. Applying these ratios
to a settlement of $575,000, defendant A pays $132,825 in non-economic damages
and $442,175 in economic damages. Defendant B is thus liable for its entire
$350,000 in non-economic damages and the remaining $557,825 in economic
damages.
Table 7- Pro Rata Ratio Method Applied to Settlement With Defendant A
(Hypothetical 1)
Total Pro Rata Exposure
Economic ( of $1,000,000) $500,000.00
Non-Economic $150,000.00
Total Pro Rata Exposure $650,000.00
Pro Rata Ratios for Damage Allocation
Economic ($500,000 of $650,000) 76.9%
Non-Economic ($150,000 of $650,000) 23.1%
Settlement Amount $575,000.00
Economic (76.9% of $575,000) $422,175.00
Non-Economic Portion (23.1% of $575,000) $132,825.00
Plaintiff's Shortfall in Non-Economic Damages
Defendant A's Exposure $150,000.00
Collected in Settlement $132,825.00
Shortfall $ 17,175.00
lessened.
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The plaintiff has still received a shortfall in non-economic damages ($17,175),
but that shortfall is much less drastic than that under the method advanced by
Xomox. More importantly, this method more accurately represents the true extent of
the settling defendant's liability when negotiations are begun, since absent any
settlement at all, each defendant will be liable for its pro rata share of the economic
damages.
The primary effect of this proportional allocation method will be to provide the
plaintiff with sufficient incentive to demand realistic settlements. Knowing the
liabilities determined by the verdict, and the allocation method that will be applied,
the plaintiff can calculate with precision how much a settlement will cost him. At the
same time, the plaintiff is not afforded the luxury the ceiling approach provides of
only needing to demand the amount of non-economic damages from the settling
defendant in order to obtain full recovery. Although the pro rata method shifts some
of the burden of firm negotiation, and perhaps the risk of insolvency, to the plaintiff,
it is justified by the fact that the settlement follows the completion of the litigation.
Throughout the litigation, the degree of solvency of each defendant is likely within
plaintiff's knowledge, and settlement at this stage in the proceedings is likely
intended merely to avoid appeal. Thus, an allocation method that provides incentive
for the plaintiff to obtain a settlement close in degree to actual liability amounts, or
incur a recovery shortfall, seems reasonable in the situation where the litigation has
passed the verdict stage.
Moreover, this pro rata ratio method is more consistent with the spirit of Pro-
position 51. This method prevents a post-verdict settlement, which merely recoups
the settling defendant's non-economic liability, from saddling the non-settling
defendant with the entire remaining judgment without any reduction by the settle-
ment. Proposition 51 was initially drafted and approved by California voters to pre-
vent this specific type of inequity. The spirit of the initiative should not be defeated
by something as technical and controllable as a method of damage allocation.
Applying the pro rata ratio method to the Xomox situation, the following results
are derived.
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Table.8 -Xomox Results Under the Pro Rata Ratio Method
*Charles Lowe's Pro Rata Total Exposure
Economic ( of $1,080,219.35) $ 54
Non-Economic $ 9
Total Pro Rata Exposure $ 63
Ratios for Damage Allocation
Economic ($540,109.67 of $632,034.47)
Non-Economic ($91,924.80 of $632,034.47)
Settlement Amount $ 45
Economic (85.5%) $ 38
Non-Economic (14.5%) $ 6
Plaintiff's Non-Economic Damage Shortfall
*Charles Lowe's Exposure $ 9
Collected in Settlement $ 6
Shortfall $ 2
Xomox's Net Joint and Several Liability
Total Exposure $1,08
Less Credits
Settlement $ 38
Worker's Comp. $ 18
Net Joint and Several Liability $ 51
.0,109.67
1,924.80
2,034.47
85.5%
14.5%
'0,000.00
4,750.00
5,250.00
1,924.80
5,250.00
6,674.80
:0,219.35
4,750.00
.1,687.51
3,781.84
A comparison of the results under the various allocation methods may help
demonstrate the benefits and drawbacks of each alternative method.
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Table 9 - Summary of Results Under Different Methods Of Allocation
Espinoza Method
Xomox's Joint and Several Liability
Non-Economic Damages
from Charles Lowe Settlement
Plaintiff's Surplus
Ceiling Method
Xomox's Joint and Several Liability
Non-Economic Damages
from Charles Lowe Settlement
Plaintiff s Shortfall
Xomox's Ratio Method
Xomox's Joint and Several Liability
Non-Economic Damages
from Charles Lowe Settlement
Plaintiff's Shortfall
Pro Rata Ratio Method
Xomox's Joint and Several Liability
Non-Economic Damages
from Charles Lowe Settlement
Plaintiffs Shortfall
$ 649,681.84
$ 201,150.00
$ 109,225.20
$ 540,456.64
$ 91,924.80
$ 0.00
$ 483,631.84
$ 35,100.00
$ 56,824.80
$ 513,781.84
$ 65,250.00
$ 26,674.80
CONCLUSION
When California voters adopted Proposition 51 they hoped that the new law
would inject some common sense into a tort system they perceived as out of control.
Requiring defendants to pay damages more proportionate to their individual degree
of fault had a logical consistency and the attraction of fairness.
At the same time, Proposition 51 did not deny deserving plaintiffs an equitable
opportunity to collect their just awards. By limiting its application to non-economic
damages, Proposition 51 did not deny plaintiffs too large a portion of the damages
they sought. In this way, Proposition 51 was intended to achieve the proper balance
between the competing interests of plaintiffs and defendants, a balance which the tort
system itself continually places at the forefront of its evolution.
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However, in application, Proposition 51 created conflicts that could not be solved
neatly and precisely. Worker's compensation awards do not involve considerations
of fault; thus, Proposition 51's focus on division of damages in proportion to fault
did not translate neatly into worker's compensation situations. Similarly, settlements
remove individual defendants from the equitable calculus envisioned by Proposition
51, and the settlement amounts themselves are not amenable to precise translation
into Proposition 51 terms.
Thus, although the mandate of Proposition 51 may have been clear, the courts
were forced to apply that mandate to situations where perfect application was not
possible. The method of allocation utilized in these situations, specifically worker's
compensation and post-verdict settlements, impacted the parties in the present case,
as well as created implications for future parties. Because of these downstream
impacts, any allocation method adopted must include a realistic evaluation of the
ripples it creates when applied.
The allocation method utilized by the appellate court in Xomox seems appropriate
for the worker's compensation situation, but creates potentially negative incentives
in the post-verdict settlement situation. One's choice of emphasizing the interest of
the plaintiff in obtaining full recovery, or the defendant's interest in paying only what
is equitable, plays a large role in determining which allocation method is appropriate.
However, the voters of California have spoken as to the appropriate result in this
balancing of competing interests. Proposition 51 expressly mandates that defendants
pay damages more closely related to their degree of fault. The mechanism by which
this mandate is to be achieved is to limit defendant liability for non-economic
damages to the exact proportion as determined by their degree of fault. As seen
above, this mechanism may not be completely effective in limiting a particular
defendant's liability.
The allocation method used in Proposition 51 situations should reflect the broad
purpose of the law-defendant liability should more accurately reflect their degree
of culpability. With this. goal in mind, it is more appropriate to adopt a damage
allocation method that shifts some of the burden of negotiation and the risk of a
recovery shortfall on to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's interests cannot be wholly aban-
doned, but the appropriate allocation method must place the mandate of Proposition
51 at the forefront. This requires emphasizing the defendant's interest in equitable
treatment over the plaintiff's interest in total recovery. Perhaps this is a harsh result,
but it goes no farther than what the voters demanded when they enacted Proposition
51.
